Why Karzai Can't Be Counted Out

As the Obama administration considers sending up to 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan, Monday's long-expected finding of rampant fraud in the August elections marks a clear starting point for putting a better Afghan government in place.

But observers in Kabul suggest that goal could still remain elusive.
Afghanistan's Electoral Complaints Commission indicated on Monday that almost a third of the votes cast in August elections for President Hamid Karzai were fraudulent, pushing his tally below the 50 percent he needs to avoid a run-off.

It is still far from clear whether Karzai, broadly criticized for leading a government hobbled by corruption and inefficiency, will accept the commission's judgment and agree either to new elections or to a coalition with his closest competitor, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah.

"It all depends on Karzai," says Haroun Mir, director of Afghanistan's Center for Research and Policy Studies. "If he accepts the results there will be a compromise government; if he doesn't there will be a political impasse."

Mir believes both options doom future stability in the country. "A coalition government composed of antagonistic forces will fall apart in a few months," he says.

The international community's anxiety over the government has been evident in the flurry of diplomatic action in Kabul. In recent days an array of senior diplomats and politicians, including France's Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and U.S. Sen. John Kerry, have passed through the capital.

For all that, though, the mostly foreign members of the commission that ruled on the vote fraud Monday don't have the last word in calling for a second round of elections. The country's Independent Electoral Commission, where figures considered close to Karzai have the upper hand, said it would decide in the next day and half whether new elections were mandated. There is little doubt that Karzai will remain president, whether by standing on his previous victory, submitting to power-sharing talks, or winning a second round of elections. The question is the shape of a new government and how much power the president will wield in it.

To find a way out of the country's political dead end, Mir advocates a repeat of the international conference held in Bonn in 2001, which set up a caretaker government in the wake of the Taliban's expulsion from Kabul. "Such a government would have greater credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans than any government formed as a result of the current contested presidential elections," he says.

Mir even supports extending an olive branch to the Taliban and other groups in armed conflict with the government. That approach has been rejected, however, by both sides in the election.

Abdullah, a former foreign minister, has said that the current structure concentrates too much power in the president, and he has forcefully argued for moves to strengthen the parliament. Yet observers believe his allies will push him instead simply to take a number of key Cabinet positions in a Karzai-led government.

Some international actors believe such an outcome would be the best bet for a stable government. But those seeking to curb the president's powers want a more radical recasting of the government. There is new interest in an earlier U.S. proposal to create a powerful CEO-style post as a counterweight to the president. One man earlier seen as a possible fit for that position, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, has flown into Kabul to broker an agreement between the two sides.

Khalilzad has his work cut out for him. Afghanistan's current political structure provides no framework for a coalition government or power sharing. It is based on the "first past the post" and "winner takes all" system that doesn't even accord a formal place to political parties. Any power-sharing agreement would therefore be based on a political deal and the goodwill of a handful of individuals.

One wild card in the already unstable situation is Karzai himself. His aides say he is fuming over international pressure to acknowledge electoral fraud, and may balk at any attempts to curtail his power. Karzai has powerful allies among the warlords in some of the country's most fiercely contested provinces.

Afghan political analysts have learned to appreciate Karzai's political deftness, which he demonstrated in successful jousting over the timing of the August elections, originally scheduled for last April.

As winter approaches, those observers are warning that the international community should be careful what it wishes for. They warn that Karzai could accept the findings of the Electoral Complaints Commission, but then announce that he would prefer a second round of polling rather than share power.

Yet there is a broad consensus in Kabul that another round of elections at this stage would be fraught with problems. Says one Western diplomat in the Afghan capital: "The weather, the logistical issues and the insecurity make a second round undesirable."