Iranian scientists on Tuesday began the process of turning about 55 pounds of low-enriched uranium gas into high-enriched uranium gas, government officials told state television. That operation could produce the medical isotopes Iran claims it needs – but also the weapons-grade uranium the West fears is Tehran's true goal.
President Barack Obama said hours later that diplomatic efforts to muster "a significant regime of sanctions" to dissuade Iran are "moving along fairly quickly," and that Washington hopes over the next several weeks to show Iran how isolated it will become by continuing its enrichment activities.
So how dangerous is the Iranian threat, how capable are its atomic engineers and how much leverage do the Obama administration and its allies have over the oil-producing Persian Gulf nation? Thanks to treaties signed by Iran, international observers have some insight into its nuclear program, along with significant doubts bred by the secretive history of Iranian atomic exploits. And the mobilization of United Nations-sanctioned punishment of Iran or any other country is always subject to the give-and-take of geopolitics. But here's a quick look at some of the key elements in play:
The Science
What Iran claims to have done Tuesday is inject the 55 pounds of 3.5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride gas into a cascade of 164 centrifuges at its nuclear facility in Natanz, south of Tehran. The series of centrifuges spin the uranium around at high speed to collect material with higher percentages of uranium's fissionable isotope, uranium-235. The stated goal of the operation is to achieve an enrichment level of 20 percent. Iran says that would fit the needs of the Tehran research reactor, which could produce medical isotopes used to treat cancer and for radiography. But the same enrichment process could be used to produce uranium at even higher levels of enrichment, and possibly as high as 90 percent – enough for an atomic weapon.
The Threat
The United States, France, Germany, Britain and others fear not only the creation of an Iranian nuclear bomb, they are also concerned about what Dennis Blair, U.S. director of national intelligence, described last week as the "real risk that its nuclear program will prompt other countries in the Middle East to pursue nuclear options." While Iran's nuclear intentions are unknown – Tehran usually claims it enriches uranium to make fuel for power plants – the size, placement and security of its nuclear facilities, including one hidden until last September, arouse suspicion in Washington and in Vienna, home of the International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA inspectors were in Natanz on Tuesday when Iran began enriching the 3.5 percent uranium.
It isn't clear how efficiently the Natanz centrifuges will work, as the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security noted in a report on the move. But if they work smoothly, ISIS believes Iran could add cascades – chains of linked centrifuges – to the effort and possibly enrich to even higher levels, citing medical needs. "While likely to provoke an international crisis, it is conceivable that if Iran continues along this path, it could eventually insist on the need to produce weapon-grade uranium" for what it claims is civilian use, the ISIS report says.
The U.S. intelligence community believes that Iran has the technical know-how to produce a nuclear weapon if it attains weapons-grade uranium. And Blair told Congress that many of Iran's ballistic missiles "are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload."
The Politics
Blair suggested that Iran's nuclear decision-making "is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran." In other words, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the rest of the Iranian leadership pursue uranium enrichment when they think it's worth the international censure, but might not when they think it isn't.
The IAEA has been pushing Iran to accept a deal offered by the West last fall to essentially ship its uranium to Russia and France, which would in turn give Iran uranium that would fuel its Tehran research reactor but would be difficult to weaponize. Iran first agreed and then rejected the deal. The U.S., its partners and the IAEA have been pushing Iran to return to the table ever since, with Washington and some European countries holding out the threat of sanctions. In the latest round of rhetoric, Ahmadinejad last week said Iran might be amenable, only to order the new enrichment this week.
"That indicates to us that, despite their posturing that their nuclear power is only for civilian use, that they, in fact, continue to pursue a course that would lead to weaponization," Obama said. France and Britain are on board with the notion of new U.N. sanctions – which would most likely target the economic interests of the Revolutionary Guard and other overseers of the nuclear program.
Russia, a frequent opponent of sanctions in the past, has suggested its patience with Tehran is running out. "Iran says it doesn't want to have nuclear weapons. But its actions, including its decision to enrich uranium to 20 percent, have raised doubts among other nations, and these doubts are quite well-founded," said Nikolai Patrushev, a top Russian security official, according to Russian news agencies cited by The Associated Press.
But China, the fifth veto-wielding permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, remains opposed to sanctions, making Beijing one of the biggest question marks in all the scientific, security and diplomatic calculations over Iran's nuclear activities. "How China operates at the Security Council as we pursue sanctions," Obama said, "is something that we're going to have to see."





