The 4 Big Things BP Left Out of Its Spill Report

ANALYSIS

(Sept. 9) -- So the world now knows what's in BP's much-publicized internal report on what happened on the Deepwater Horizon rig. But what's not in the document?

Quite a bit.

The report lays out in 193 pages, with a full complement of appendices, eight factors that BP says converged to cause the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. It is a virtual compendium of failures and safety lapses, including some by BP itself, and includes a minute-by-minute account of events leading to the two large explosions that ultimately sent more than 5 million barrels of oil into the gulf waters and cost 11 workers their lives.

Yet the report also ignores, sometimes conveniently, issues of fact and credibility that may prove relevant to government investigators and attorneys suing the energy giant. Here are the four key things missing from BP's version of events.

1. A Full Explanation of How BP Reached Its Conclusions

The first page of the report does not contain a title, but it could have been labeled "The Disclaimer." In eight succinct paragraphs, BP lists what the report does not do. Witnesses are not identified, nor are any transcripts of their interviews included in the appendix. Legal standards were not applied that would separate hearsay from eyewitness accounts. The report states that evidence was, at times, "contradictory, unclear or uncorroborated," and that investigators did not "seek to make credibility determinations in such cases."

In other words, it's difficult for readers to evaluate the reliability of the statements.

The report was prepared by Mark Bly, head of BP's safety and operations, who spent four months investigating the disaster with a 50-member team of experts. BP added that its team "used its best judgment but recognizes that others could reach different conclusions or ascribe different weight to particular information."

BP's account of events is based primarily on data and interviews with its own employees and experts, with only limited contributions from any of BP's three other partners: Halliburton Co., which made the cement; Cameron, which built the blowout preventer; and Transocean, which owned the rig and bought and maintained the blowout preventer. The public finger-pointing between the partners, which began soon after the disaster occurred, continued following the report's release. Halliburton and Transocean criticized BP's report for being rife with omissions and errors, and each noted that its version of events differs significantly from BP's.

Additionally, Don Van Nieuwenhuise, director of Petroleum Geoscience Programs at the University of Houston, said he has reservations about the kind of modeling used by BP to reach some of its conclusions.

"The layperson doesn't realize that you can model almost anything," he told AOL News. "When we do models, it's what if this, what if that. We try to find out if there is a solution that's unique. That no other possibilities could have happened except this one. My gut feeling is there are other possibilities in addition to this one in the report."

2. More Insight into How Key Decisions Were Made -- and By Whom

BP's report says that BP and Transocean workers "incorrectly accepted" the results of a pressure test. But while BP blames Transocean rig workers for failing to recognize the flow of hydrocarbons into the well, it provides no explanation as to why they made that discovery too late to prevent the explosion.

"The thing that jumps out is the implication that the major decisions that led to the blowout were not BP decisions," said Richard Nagareda, a Vanderbilt University law professor who has tracked the civil litigation on the case. "They don't put it that way, but that's the implication."

Van Nieuwenhuise also wonders about the analysis that went into the use of the cement. "It's one thing to say Halliburton made the wrong kind of cement. But I don't think they explain who made the decision to use it," he said.

U.S. Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, found a further shortcoming where questions of accountability are concerned. He asserted in a statement that the report does not address what role BP's corporate culture may have played in contributing to the cause of the disaster.

3. Consideration of the Design of the Well Itself

BP's outgoing CEO, Tony Hayward, said in a statement that it appears "unlikely" that BP's design of the Macondo well "contributed to the incident." Yet others, including BP's partners on the Deepwater Horizon rig, are not so quick to draw that conclusion. Transocean dismissed the document as a "self-serving report that attempts to conceal the critical factor that set the stage for the Macondo incident: BP's fatally flawed well design." Others have criticized the chosen design as risky.

Van Nieuwenhuise said he was troubled by BP's assessment. "That bothers me a lot. How could the type of well design they had have impacted some of these things?" he asked. "They didn't use the appropriate number of centralizers in that last pipe. That last pipe could have rattled around a lot, or might not have been sitting perfectly in the hole."

4. What Exactly Happened to the Blowout Preventer?

The 300-ton apparatus remains the key piece of physical evidence, and an official determination of why it malfunctioned will reveal much about the cause of the spill. Investigators have concluded that the explosion in the rig was set off when methane gas shot up through the well, but they haven't yet determined how the gas escaped -- or just why the blowout preventer, or BOP, didn't seal the well pipe and shut off the flow, as it was designed to do.

The device was hoisted by a crane from the ocean floor last Saturday and moved to a NASA facility in New Orleans. BP's report raises issues about maintenance, which could be blamed on its partners, while ignoring others, such as design, that could shift blame back to itself.

Among the remaining questions that are not answered: Was the device installed properly? What criteria were used to decide if this specific blowout preventer was appropriate for use at the Macondo well? What considerations were made, given the unique circumstances at the well under which it was expected to operate?

Daniel Becnel, one of the attorneys representing fishermen and property owners suing BP, said the blowout preventer is so critical to the overall investigation that he doesn't see how BP could make any finding until it is examined.

"The big issue is we don't know what the hell was done to the BOP," he said. "How do they know what the causes are if that hasn't even been examined yet?"