How Serious Is the European Terror Alert?

PARIS (Oct. 4) -- How frightened should American travelers be following the State Department's alert on "the potential for terrorist attacks in Europe?"

The answer: The worries are serious, but the threat may be less dire than headlines suggest.

In Paris, military and police patrols today appeared more sporadic than during past periods of high alert, when checkpoints dotted thoroughfares in the city center and at tourist meccas like the Louvre museum and the Champs Elysees. French counterterrorist troops were deployed at the Eiffel Tower, cited last week as a potential target, but in lesser numbers than during earlier high-alert periods, such as the spate of bombings in the mid-1990s by an Algerian Islamist group. In much of the Metro system, little extra police presence was visible.

So what's a U.S. tourist or business traveler to think? Here's some of what we know, and don't know, about the travel alert issued on Sunday.

1. What Are the Supposed Targets?

The U.S. government alert was geographically vague, simply mentioning Europe. Intelligence reports -- based on electronic "chatter," sources along the Afghan-Pakistan border and interrogations of alleged militants detained in the region -- suggest the potential plot focused on Britain, Denmark, France and Germany.

The travel alert, which on the official danger hierarchy is less earnest than a travel warning, is almost as broad and unspecific when it comes to naming the potential sorts of target. It mentions "official and private interests" and "public transportation systems and other tourist infrastructure," while noting that "terrorists have targeted and attacked subway and rail systems, as well as aviation and maritime services." The intelligence reports that led to the alert say the plot was developing along the lines of the deadly three-day assault on Mumbai, India, in 2008 that targeted landmark hotels used by Westerners, a major rail station and Jewish organizations.

2. How Real or Imminent Is the Threat?

Those same intelligence reports suggest the plot, examined by U.S. and allied officials for weeks or longer, was on the drawing board but wasn't close to being "operationally" active.

But terrorism, and specifically the Islamist threat posed by al-Qaida and other groups that carry its banner, is a continuing hazard that may never fade away completely.

Patrick Kennedy, the undersecretary of state for management, noted that the "travel alert's purpose is to disseminate information about relatively short-term conditions that pose potential serious risk to the security of American citizens traveling in a country or in a region" -- not unlike specific alerts issued during hurricane season in the Atlantic or when a volcano shut down European air travel in the spring.

And while "there could be a eureka moment where there is information that comes to our attention that -- bingo, that's it, we issue ... an alert immediately," Kennedy said, often it's a cumulative process: "Bits and pieces of information come together."

Had there been a "eureka moment" or more material evidence of a coming threat, it's likely that someone much more senior in the Obama administration would have made the announcement. And Kennedy repeatedly emphasized that "we are not, not, not saying that they should defer travel to Europe at this time. Absolutely not."

3. So Why Now?

This is a tricky one.

As Kennedy put it, sometimes "a picture begins to form and that picture reaches a point" where it becomes appropriate to issue an alert.

But this alert comes after the U.S. may have already disrupted the plot.

In response to the alarming intelligence, U.S. forces launched a series of drone strikes against militants in Pakistan thought to be coordinating the plot, including one in North Waziristan on Sept. 25 that killed Sheikh Fateh al-Masri, an Egypian-born senior commander in al-Qaida.

Such pre-emptive military strikes have been among the most potent American counterterror weapons in the post 9/11 era. And the travel alert may be pre-emptive as well.

One of the primary rules of counterterrorism is that terrorists prefer a soft target, especially one that isn't on guard. So it's possible that the government's intended audience is the terrorists as much as their potential targets.