Opinion: The Lost Year in the Afghan War

One year ago, President Barack Obama pledged to turn a new page in the war in Afghanistan. At the U.S. military academy at West Point, he unveiled a new strategy for the war based on three core elements: "a military effort to create the conditions for a transition (to Afghan control); a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan."

A year later, the lack of success in achieving these goals is striking.

The U.S. is years away from transition to Afghan control. The much vaunted civilian surge hasn't materialized. And effective partnership with Pakistan has barely progressed. Worst of all, U.S. military deaths and civilian casualties continue to multiply.

Throughout 2010, the U.S. and its NATO allies have hit one roadblock after another in Afghanistan. If the Obama administration wants to see greater success in 2011, then it should take heed of the famous words of Andrew Jackson to "elevate them guns a little lower" by pursuing a more achievable and realistic policy.

Among the problems over the past 12 months:

The Counterinsurgency Disconnect

While the West Point speech was supposed to clarify U.S. policy in Afghanistan, the White House and Pentagon were, from the beginning, seemingly not on the same page. In January, The Washington Post was reporting that "nearly a month after Obama unveiled his revised Afghanistan strategy, military and civilian leaders have come away with differing views of several fundamental aspects of the president's new approach."

While Vice President Biden stated declaratively that "this is not a [counterinsurgency] strategy," unnamed senior Pentagon officials asserted that Gen. Stanley McChrystal's plan for the war was, in fact, "still counterinsurgency."

On the ground, the Pentagon view was winning out. Even though Obama had told U.S. military leaders not to send U.S. troops into places that could potentially be turned over to Afghan security services within 18 months, U.S. Marines "attacked" the southern Afghanistan town of Marjah -- an area of instability that few expect to be turned over to the Afghan army any time soon.

But the offensive provided the military an opportunity to demonstrate its new approach to war fighting in Afghanistan: population-centric counterinsurgency, which put a premium on protecting the population, providing good governance and extending the legitimacy of the Afghan government rather than simply killing insurgents. McChrystal ludicrously declared that NATO and Afghan forces would supply "government-in-a-box" to Marjah -- as if governance and state legitimacy could be delivered so easily.

A year later, that goal, not surprisingly, lies in tatters, not only because of the ineffectiveness of the Afghan government (a point reinforced by discredited legislative elections this past September) but also because Afghan security forces are not close to being an effective fighting force.

Indeed, when McChrystal resigned in July as Afghan commander after an ill-advised interview with Rolling Stone magazine, his replacement, Gen. David Petraeus, eschewed the hearts and minds counterinsurgency on display in Marjah. He returned to a policy that has historically defined counterinsurgent efforts -- killing the enemy, often ruthlessly.

In November there were three and a half times more airstrikes than the year before. Night raids and special force operations targeting Taliban commanders have also increased significantly. Even house demolitions have become practically "routine."

McChrystal was fond of saying that the most important metric for success in Afghanistan was not insurgents killed but civilians protected. Today, NATO and U.S. press releases regularly brag about body counts and Taliban commanders assassinated.

Tactical Gains, Strategic Roadblocks

While the escalation in military force has pushed the Taliban back on its heels, less clear are the long-term benefits. Indeed, these short-term tactical steps that are being hailed as "successes" mask the larger strategic obstacles for the U.S. and NATO.

For example, Pakistan continues to provide sanctuary for Afghan Taliban fighters and leaders. In February when Pakistan arrested a top Taliban lieutenant, Mullah Baradar, the initial indication was that Islamabad had made a strategic shift against the Taliban. More likely, however, was that the arrest was an effort to squash any political deal between the Afghan Taliban and Karzai government that didn't protect Pakistani interests.

Recent U.S. intelligence reports dismally suggest that Pakistan continues to view the group instead as a strategic asset for exercising influence in Afghanistan and is unlikely to turn on them. And without a Pakistani change of heart, there is little hope of winning the war in Afghanistan -- no matter how much military pressure the Taliban is subjected to.

The next obstacle is the corrupt and ineffectual Afghan government. Efforts by the U.S. to get the Karzai regime to crack down on endemic corruption have not only failed; they have also worsened tensions between the two governments. While the U.S. continues to devote significant resources to training the Afghan army and police, both forces have a long way to go until they will be able to stand up on their own or be fully trusted by all Afghans.

And then there is the Taliban, which remains a resilient and flexible enemy. Throughout much of 2010, Taliban insurgents have seeded violence across once stable northern and western Afghanistan, in effect nationalizing the insurgency and further destabilizing the country.
Whatever near-term tactical successes military chiefs can point to, they pale next to these strategic hindrances, which have only intensified over the past year.

A Way Forward?

So what needs to change in 2011? First and foremost, the U.S. and NATO must identify a political strategy for Afghanistan that will lessen U.S. involvement in the conflict. Indeed, the current military effort -- focused on pounding the Taliban into submission and forcing the insurgents to the negotiating table -- seems more likely to encourage the Taliban to dig in and wait out U.S. forces rather than quickly ending the war.

Over the past year, there has been political jockeying on both sides, but there are more "talks about talks" rather than actual negotiations. One way to improve this process would be to create an independent, third-party facilitator to lead negotiations among all parties -- the U.S. and NATO, the Karzai government, the various Taliban groups and, above all, Pakistan.

To smooth the process of reconciliation, the U.S. military would likely have to embrace a series of confidence-building measures with the Taliban -- including releasing detainees, reducing special operations attacks and negotiating local cease-fires.

Efforts to train the Afghan army must be maintained; drone attacks against al-Qaida leaders in Pakistan -- one of the few successful elements of the current U.S. strategy -- should continue; and the U.S. and NATO should reiterate a long-term political and military commitment to Afghanistan's security and viability.

To be sure, political reconciliation will necessitate a series of tough choices by Obama, but the effort must begin sooner rather than later. It has become increasingly clear to most Afghan observers that the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is simply not working. Neither the U.S. nor Afghanistan can afford another lost year.