Six Things You Probably Didn't Know About the Oil Spill

WASHINGTON -- Of the tens of thousands of people who worked to clean up the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, many had competing loyalties and agendas. Unified, they were not. Complicating matters, local, state and federal officials felt enormous pressure to avoid being seen as in cahoots with BP.

Because the federal government's response was slow off the mark, President Barack Obama got much of the blame. In the Oil Spill Commission's final report, the following excerpts from "Chapter Five: Response and Containment," give a first look at some of what went on behind the scenes:

1. The Myth of Obama's Katrina

"Local resentment became a media theme and then a self-fulfilling prophesy. Even those who privately thought the federal government was doing the best it could under the circumstances could not say so publicly. Coast Guard responders watched Governor Jindal -- and the TV cameras following him -- return to what appeared to be the same spot of oiled marsh day after day to complain about the inadequacy of the federal response, even though only a small amount of marsh was then oiled.

"When the Coast Guard sought to clean up that piece of affected marsh, Governor Jindal refused to confirm its location. Journalists encouraged state and local officials and residents to display their anger at the federal response, and offered coverage when they did. Anderson Cooper reportedly asked a Parish President to bring an angry, unemployed offshore oil worker on his show. When the Parish President could not promise the worker would be 'angry,' both were disinvited."

2. The Boom Wars, Part 1

(The bright orange floating boom was laid out in long ribbons on the surface to keep the oil away from the coastal shoreline. It was not especially effective at holding back the oil. But that did not matter. To the residents of the gulf, it was a visible barrier that gave them a sense of reassurance, whereas other efforts going on offshore did not. So the struggle over "boom" began, according to the report.)

"Boom became a symbol of federal responsiveness to local communities. NOAA scientists worked through the night, every night, to prepare oil trajectory forecasts for federal responders to review as they began their days. Responders used those forecasts to plan their actions, including where to place boom. Federal responders thought that officials and residents complaining about lack of boom did not understand their strategy for deployment; officials and residents thought that federal responders were inattentive to local needs. The National Incident Command was not deaf to these complaints and gave an unofficial order to 'keep the parishes happy.'

"Coast Guard responders distributed many miles of boom according to political, rather than operational, imperatives. They felt hamstrung by the outrage that results when a parish or state felt slighted by allocation decisions, so they placed boom wherever they could."

3. The Boom Wars, Part 2

"Once parishes had boom, they did not want to let it go. On July 22, Parish President Billy Nungesser threatened to blow out the tires of trucks carrying away boom as the Coast Guard prepared for Tropical Storm Bonnie. Though he claimed that he was joking, the FBI called to reprimand him.

"Other parish presidents issued orders prohibiting the removal of response equipment from their parishes and threatened Coast Guard responders with arrest. Officials asked responders to measure 'feet of boom deployed' -- a statistic that was time-consuming to generate and had little value in assessing response efforts. All of these problems distracted responders from their focus on cleaning up the spill."

4. The Fighting Governors

"Every governor wanted more boom. When the oiling risk was highest in Louisiana, the Coast Guard directed boom there. Governor Riley of Alabama contended that this decision left his state's shoreline in danger. At a press conference in mid-May, Governor Jindal said that the containment boom provided to Louisiana by the Coast Guard and BP was inadequate, while local officials behind him held up pictures of oil-coated pelicans.

"Florida Department of Environmental Protection Secretary Mike Sole told reporters, 'A lot of the decisions about Florida are being made in Mobile.' He said he had warned the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, 'Florida is important. We have 770 miles of shoreline to protect. I'm concerned that we're not getting enough focus on Florida.' "

5. The Coast Guard and EPA Bicker Over Dispersants

"Different perspectives on dispersants led to conflicts between EPA and the Coast Guard. For example, on June 7, BP requested permission to spray dispersants on several large slicks. Despite federal on-scene coordinator Rear Admiral James Watson's statement that he had 'determined aerial dispersant the best and only way to mitigate the pending landfall effect of the oil spotted,' EPA would not approve the exemption.

"The Coast Guard captain leading the majority of front-line operations was furious. 'It would be a travesty,' he wrote, 'if the oil hits the beach because we did not use the tools available to fight this offshore. This responsibility needs to be placed squarely in EPA's court if it does hit the shoreline.' Later that day, without having received responses to its requests for additional data, EPA threatened to issue a directive "to stop the use of all dispersants."

6. Meanwhile, Back at the Spewing Well

"Although BP had previously turned to others in industry for advice, it had generally asked discrete questions about aspects of source control. The government team, by contrast, asked other companies to comment on BP's overall plans and to help force BP to consider contingencies.

"BP, which believed its competitors suffered from a conflict of interest, did not appreciate the increased industry involvement. After one meeting in which BP's competitors aggressively challenged its plans, BP refused to meet with them again, forcing the government teams to schedule separate meetings."